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Summary 
 
Although there is consensus in the literature that immigrants generally adjust in terms of their 
labour market status the more time they spend in the host country (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 
1985; Kahanec and Zaiceva, 2009), the economic crisis that struck Europe shortly after the 
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, referred to in this chapter as the Great Recession, may have 
stalled or even reversed such adjustment processes. In addition, the significant increase in 
east-west mobility may have changed the nature of labour market competition in the receiving 
labour markets or have had consequences for the process of adjustment. East-west mobility 
within the EU may have interacted with inflows of non-EU migrants, resulting in heightened 
competition in the labour market (Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2014; Marchetti et al., 2014). 
These effects could vary across different aspects of the market, such as labour market 
participation, employment and its quality, or the incidence of self-employment. This chapter 
provides a comprehensive perspective on labour market cleavages between migrants from 
new EU member states and natives in old EU member states for the period following the EU 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and during the Great Recession. It thus sheds light on how 
post-enlargement mobility, interacting with the consequences of the downturn, has affected 
the social fabric in the receiving countries. The chapter is structured as follows. In the first 
section, we discuss the main patterns and factors of immigrant integration in Europe. We then 
focus on post-enlargement migration and the integration of migrants from new EU member 
states in the old EU member states before and during the crisis. The methodology for 
measuring immigrant-native gaps and the data we use are outlined in the following sections. 
Finally, we measure immigrant-native labour market gaps, distinguishing between the part 
attributable to differences in the characteristics of the two groups and the cleavages resulting 
from unobservable factors.  
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Introduction 
 
The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements led to the relocation, over the period 2004–2010, of 
about three million workers from the new EU member states to the old. The free mobility of 
workers in the enlarged EU provided a larger set of possibilities for its citizens and improved 
the allocative efficiency of EU labour markets (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). The 
receiving countries gained additional ‘hands and brains’ while generally not being affected in 
terms of natives’ aggregate wages or employment (Kahanec, 2013); the sending countries, in 
turn, were relieved of labour slack and benefitted from remittances. ‘Brain drain’ has been a 
potential risk for the sending countries, but the literature actually points at the possibility of 
‘brain gain’, which may occur when migrants return to their home countries with additional 
skills acquired abroad or when the home population invests more in education in expectation 
of higher returns due to the possibility of utilizing skills more freely abroad (see Zaiceva and 
Zimmerman, 2016). Similarly, although the downskilling into jobs below a worker’s 
qualifications that characterizes much of post-enlargement migration appears undesirable, it is 
unclear whether real inefficiencies vis-à-vis feasible counterfactual scenarios have 
materialized (Kahanec, 2013).2 
 
Against this generally positive perspective, there are some fears that post-enlargement 
migration has created socioeconomic cleavages between workers from new EU member states 
and the host labor force in the receiving countries in areas such as pay, access to employment 
and/or employment quality. 3 Such cleavages could –either directly or as a side effect – 
undermine economic and social standards in the receiving countries. The effects of 
immigration, then, might not immediately concern the wages or employment of natives, but 
rather materialize as persistent immigrant–native gaps in labour market outcomes, with 
potentially detrimental effects for the social fabric and cohesion of the receiving labour 
markets.   
                                                          
2
 To illustrate the logic, it may appear inefficient for a university-educated engineer to work as a receptionist, but 
this becomes less obvious if his/her only alternative in the home country would have been unemployment or 
inactivity. 
3
 The term ‘native’ refers to the resident population in an old EU member state not originating from new EU 
member states. It does not imply nativity in the respective country. 
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In this chapter, we use EU-wide micro-level datasets from Eurostat to empirically document 
labour market gaps between domestic labour forces and migrants from new EU member 
states. We distinguish between two origins of immigrant–native labour market gaps. First, we 
look at the part of the observed raw gaps that can be explained by differences in the 
characteristics of immigrant and native populations. Such ‘explained’ gaps arise due to factors 
determined outside of the receiving labour market, including gaps in population 
characteristics between receiving and sending countries, the characteristics of migrants who 
decided to move from new EU member states, and immigrant–native differences in patterns 
of human capital acquisition in the receiving country.4 These kind of gaps could lead to 
immigrant–native inequalities and may call for policies that would mitigate problematic 
cleavages and provide for a cohesive and mutually beneficial coexistence between diverse 
populations. On their own, however, their existence does not indicate unequal treatment or 
differences in behaviour of otherwise equal immigrants and natives in the labour market.  
 
Second, we measure gaps that are not explained by differences in characteristics between 
immigrant and native populations. Cleavages defined and measured in this way may result 
from differences in individual preferences, social or ethnic capital, discrimination or other 
unobserved variables. The existence of unexplained gaps may be related to the segmentation 
of migrants into jobs of lower social or economic status. This may occur, for example, (i) as a 
temporary phenomenon related to adjustment to the demand for skills specific to the host 
country; (ii) as a consequence of processes outside migrants’ control such as discrimination; 
or (iii) as an outcome of choices made by migrants as individuals or collectivities. As an 
example of choice-driven segmentation, some temporary migrants such as nurses may find it 
unprofitable – given the short time horizon over which the returns can be reaped – to invest in 
country-specific skills such as the language of the host country and may thus take up jobs 
below their formal qualification (e.g., domestic care or service activities), possibly with 
longer working hours (Kahanec and Shields, 2013).  
 
                                                          
4
 It is, of course, possible that different labour markets attract different types of migrants, or differently affect the 
prospects of migrants and natives for acquiring human capital. Labour market attributes may thus play an 
indirect role in the human-capital and other characteristics of the native and immigrant populations.  
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Likewise, unexplained gaps in labour market outcomes between natives and immigrants may 
also signify strategic behaviour on the part of immigrant workers or the companies employing 
them aimed at reducing the costs of migrant labour as a consequence of any unobserved 
disadvantages or vulnerabilities migrant workers might face. In such circumstances, migrant 
workers may end up working for substandard remuneration or under substandard working 
conditions and, compared to observably similar natives, might not be integrated into the host 
country’s social systems, work safety standards or collective bargaining agreements – a 
situation defined in this volume as social dumping. In regard to remuneration, for example, 
migrant workers might be willing to accept working for less than what is normally paid to 
observably similar natives (with similar qualifications, occupation and other characteristics) if 
it gives them a competitive advantage or, perhaps more accurately, compensates for some 
unobserved disadvantage (also see Krings et al., this volume). All in all, then, unexplained 
gaps signify different treatment or behaviour of observationally equal immigrant and native 
populations in the labour market and signal social cleavages arising as a consequence of the 
functioning of the labour market. A policy intervention aimed at the reduction of such 
cleavages would therefore need to change the way in which immigrants and natives interact in 
the host-country labour market.5 
 
Although there is consensus in the literature that immigrants generally adjust in terms of their 
labour market status the more time they spend in the host country (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 
1985; Kahanec and Zaiceva, 2009), the economic crisis that struck Europe shortly after the 
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, referred to in this chapter as the Great Recession, might 
have stalled or even reversed such adjustment processes. Additionally, the significant increase 
in east-west mobility may have changed the nature of labour market competition in the 
receiving labour markets or have had consequences for the process of adjustment. East-west 
mobility within the EU might have interacted with inflows of non-EU migrants, resulting in 
heightened competition on the labour market (Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2014; Marchetti, 
Piazzalunga and Venturini, 2014). These effects could vary across different aspects of the 
market, such as labour market participation, employment and its quality, or the incidence of 
self-employment.  
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 Certainly, explained gaps may result from unequal treatment outside of the labor market, and unexplained gaps 
may through workers’ expectations and subsequent decisions (for example to invest less in own human capital in 
case of a negative unexplained gap) engender explained gaps.  
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This chapter provides a comprehensive perspective on labour market cleavages between 
migrants from new EU member states and natives in old EU member states for the period 
following the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and during the Great Recession. It thus 
sheds light on how post-enlargement mobility, interacting with the consequences of the 
downturn, has affected the social fabric in the receiving countries. The chapter is structured as 
follows. In the first section, we discuss the main patterns and factors of immigrant integration 
in Europe. We then focus on post-enlargement migration and the integration of migrants from 
new EU member states in the old EU member states before and during the crisis. The 
methodology for measuring immigrant–native gaps and the data we use are outlined in the 
following sections. Finally, we measure immigrant–native labour market gaps, distinguishing 
between the part attributable to differences in the characteristics of the two groups and the 
cleavages resulting from unobservable factors. Brief conclusions follow.  
 
 
Migrants and natives in European labour markets 
 
The literature on migration and immigrant integration reports significant differences in the 
labour market outcomes of immigrants and natives, which may fade away, however, with 
immigrants’ tenure in the host country (Kahanec and Zaiceva, 2009). Dustmann and Frattini 
(2011) investigate the labour market performance of EU and non-EU immigrants in Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, France and Italy. Using the 2009 wave of the EU Labour Force Survey 
(EU-LFS), the authors find that immigrant earnings are located at the bottom of the overall 
earnings distribution. They show that around 75% of migrant households from new EU 
member states have earnings below the median income of native households. After 
controlling for demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education and occupation, the 
probability of being at the bottom of the earnings profile remains significantly higher for EU 
and non-EU migrants than for natives in Belgium, France and Italy.  
 
Some of the theoretical explanations for the differences between immigrants and comparable 
natives include those based on the market value of the education acquired in different sending 
countries, the lack of country-specific skills such as language and/or knowledge of the 
receiving countries’ labour market institutions, precarious employment, spatial segregation, 
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institutional factors and various forms of discrimination (Huber et al., 2010; De la Rica, Glitz 
and Ortega, 2015). Language skills, for example, contribute positively to immigrants’ human 
capital and increase their productivity in the labour market. In addition, the acquisition of 
language fosters social and economic integration. The relevance of language may be less 
significant for high-skilled workers, who are more likely to work in positions with English 
rather than the local language as the working language. It might also be, however, that 
immigrants, even those who are less skilled, work in ethnic enclaves and communicate in 
their own language at work. The link between language proficiency and productivity has been 
empirically substantiated by several studies. For Germany, Dustmann and van Soest (2002) 
use a panel data analysis to show that a good command of the German language is associated 
with a 10% wage premium among migrants. For Spain, Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica 
(2007) report that Latin American immigrants perform better in the labour market than 
immigrants from non-Spanish-speaking countries, thus supporting the idea that language is an 
important determinant of employment and earnings gaps. Entorf and Minoui (2005) provide 
interesting evidence regarding the importance of language in European countries. The authors 
observe that students with foreign parents and the foreign language spoken at home 
underperform relative to their native counterparts in the PISA evaluation. The educational 
disadvantage of immigrant children can translate into a disadvantage on the labour market 
later in life.  
 
Immigrants appear to be disadvantaged relative to natives also in terms of their employment 
probabilities and occupational distribution. Dustmann and Frattini (2011) investigate the 
labour market performance of immigrant workers from other EU countries using a pooled 
sample of EU-LFS surveys from 2007 to 2009. The authors show that even if immigrants and 
natives lived in the same areas and had identical demographic characteristics, immigrants 
would still have lower employment probabilities than natives in all countries except for 
Greece, where the conditional difference was found to be close to zero. The authors further 
measure the degree of segmentation of immigrants into particular occupations. Controlling for 
workers’ age, gender, education and region of residence, they find that in most countries EU 
immigrants work in less skilled occupations relative to their native counterparts. Only in 
Belgium, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands does the occupational disadvantage between 
natives and EU immigrants disappear.  
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The labour market situation of migrants also depends on the level of their formal education. 
Huber et al. (2010) propose that high-skilled migrants are more vulnerable and face higher 
unemployment risks than low-skilled migrants when it comes to finding employment on 
arrival in a new country. Low-skilled migrants have lower chances that any given job offered 
to them is below their qualification, so ultimately more job offers are acceptable to them 
compared to highly skilled migrants. A conditional analysis based on EU-LFS data from 
2006–2007 confirms the hypothesis that high-skilled migrant workers have lower 
probabilities of employment compared to less skilled migrants; this outcome holds generally 
for migrants across the origins distinguished in the survey. The authors further confirm that 
high- and medium-skilled migrants have a significantly higher probability of being 
overqualified than natives, conditional on gender, age and sector of employment. Migrants 
from the EU-12 exhibit the highest probability of over-qualification in employment, while the 
probability of over-qualification is significantly lower for migrants born in the EU-15. 6 
 
Dustmann and Frattini (2011) show that the labour market performance of immigrants 
improves with time spent in the host country. Similarly, Huber et al. (2010) show that the 
probability of employment of the foreign born of all skill levels increases with the duration of 
their stay. These findings are corroborated by Kahanec and Zaiceva (2009), who compare the 
role of nativity and citizenship in old and new EU member states and show that it is foreign 
origin that is the key factor in Western Europe, whereas in Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), 
both foreign origin and citizenship result in substantial labour market gaps.  
 
The higher incidence of precarious employment observed among immigrants may arise from 
a variety of factors, including labour market rigidities that tend to favour insiders over 
outsiders. Dustmann and Frattini (2011) point to the role of institutions, reporting that in 
countries with stricter employment protection legislation, the occupational distribution of 
immigrants is different to that of the natives, particularly for immigrants from outside the 
EU-15. The authors explain that in countries with higher employment protection, access to 
particular occupations is more difficult for immigrants, while the probability of employment 
is not associated with the protection legislation. D’Amuri and Peri (2010) confirm that 
                                                          
6
 EU-12 refers to the EU member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. EU-15 refers to the pre-2004 EU 
member states.  
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immigrants push natives into occupations with higher skill contents in Europe, and that the 
reallocation is more intense in less protected markets. The authors conclude that a high degree 
of labour market protection reduces labour markets’ ability to absorb immigrants through 
occupational upgrading of natives.  
 
The labour market status of immigrants is shown to be more sensitive to the business cycle 
than that of natives. Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel (2010) find that the unemployment 
probabilities of immigrants in Germany and the UK are significantly more sensitive to the 
economic cycle than those of natives, even after conditioning for individual characteristics 
and the region of residence. De la Rica and Polonyankina (2013) explain how recently arrived 
immigrants displaced earlier immigrants during the recession years in Spain. They also 
demonstrate a negative impact of competition for jobs during the Great Recession. 
Specifically, for 2008–2012, the authors show that relative to natives, immigrants in Spain 
moved into jobs characterized by higher manual content, such as those requiring 
finger dexterity, body coordination and strength. 
 
The evidence of discrimination against immigrants is based on their differential treatment in 
the labour market compared to natives with the same qualifications (e.g., lower callback rates 
in response to submitted job applications). An edited volume by Kahanec and Zimmermann 
(2011) maps the social and labour market situation of ethnic minorities in Europe and 
demonstrates that immigrant and ethnic minority groups are often disadvantaged by 
unobservable factors such as gaps in social or ethnic capital, but also discrimination. Kahanec 
and Zaiceva (2009) report that while immigrants and non-citizens may possess 
sociodemographic characteristics that are superior to those possessed by native populations in 
the labour market, unobserved factors, such as discrimination, disadvantage them 
significantly. Kahanec, Kim and Zimmermann (2013) map the barriers to immigrant inclusion 
in the European labour markets and welfare systems: language barriers and human capital 
gaps, problematic recognition of foreign qualifications, unequal treatment, lack of 
transparency in the labour market and legal barriers. 
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Post-enlargement migration and the Great Recession  
 
Following the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the gradual extension of the right of free 
movement of workers enabled many citizens from new EU member states to seek 
employment in the old EU member states. As a consequence, the inflows of workers from 
CEE to Western European countries have risen significantly since 2004, although the trend 
declined sharply during the crisis (Kahanec, 2013). Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) evaluate 
the scale, diversity and determinants of labour migration in Europe and observe different 
patterns of migration into EU-15 countries. Cultural, linguistic and geographical distances 
between pairs of source and destination countries are found to be an important determinant of 
migration inflows. While Poland was the main sending country to most of the EU-15 
countries, Estonians are dominant in Finland, and Romanians in Spain and Italy. Because 
these new migrants’ decision to leave their own countries is for the most part driven by 
employment considerations, and because typical barriers to mobility such as visa or residence 
and work permits do not constrain their mobility within the EU (after the expiration of 
transitional arrangements wherever they were applied), these new migrant populations are 
quite fluid and able to respond to changing economic conditions (Pytlikova, 2014; Kahanec et 
al., 2016).  
 
The Great Recession had profound impacts on the world economy, with significant 
consequences for European economies. It adversely affected labour markets, causing 
unemployment to increase rapidly across Europe. If immigrant workers encounter 
disadvantages in the labour market, these may remain latent in better times, but they become 
acute during economic downturns when jobs are destroyed and the competition for jobs 
intensifies. On the other hand, as immigrants from the EU-12 tend to be skilled and young 
(Kahanec, 2013), they may more easily move to alternative destinations within Europe; one 
could thus expect them to be relatively resilient to the crisis. 
 
However, a recent OECD SOPEMI report (2013) shows that the recent downturn has had a 
substantial negative impact on the labour force and especially on foreign-born persons. The 
report uses individual EU-LFS data to descriptively compare the employment, unemployment 
and long-term unemployment trends of native and immigrant workers. The findings suggest 
that young and low-skilled migrants were among the most affected, while the performance of 
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women and high-skilled migrants was less affected during the recession. Voicu and Vlase 
(2012) use three waves of the European Social Survey to confirm that high-skilled immigrants 
exhibited a higher ability to keep paid employment during the recent crisis relative to 
medium- and low-skilled immigrants. However, the authors show as well that the high-skilled 
immigrants had lower odds of obtaining employment as compared to high-skilled natives, and 
that these differences were amplified during the economic downturn.  
 
The OECD report further finds that a large share of the job losses was concentrated among 
those with temporary and fixed-term contracts and among those working in construction and 
manufacturing – in other words, in types of jobs and sectors with a high concentration of 
migrants. On the other hand, the services sector in Europe has recorded the greatest increases 
in migrant employment, given that many new jobs were created in ‘residential care activities’, 
‘activities of households as employers of domestic personnel’ and ‘human health services’. 
The balance of the effects of being a migrant in the enlarged EU during the Great Recession is 
thus an empirical question, which we will investigate in the next section.   
 
 
Measuring migrant–native gaps  
 
In the analysis of labour market gaps between natives and migrants from new EU member 
states, we employ the Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) counterfactual decomposition 
technique to study mean outcome differences between these groups. Non-linear regression 
models are applied to decompose the difference in an outcome variable between two groups – 
native and immigrant population – into a part that is attributed to differences in characteristics 
(interpreted as an explained component that does not imply any treatment or behavioural 
disparities in the labour market7) and an unexplained component that arises due to behavioural 
or treatment inequalities between observably equal workers in the labour market. 
 
We adapt the framework to represent two groups, native (n) and migrant (m) individuals 
characterized by two relationships  
                                                          
7
 However, sociodemographic differences of this type may result from inequalities arising outside the labour 
market.  
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𝑌𝑛 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝑋𝑛′ 𝛽𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛       (1)  𝑌𝑚 = 𝛼𝑚 + 𝑋𝑚′ 𝛽𝑚 + 𝜀𝑚,       (2) 
where Y is the outcome variable; X is the vector of individual characteristics; α and β are the 
intercept and the vector of coefficients, respectively; 𝜀 is an error term; and subscripts m and n 
denote migrants and natives, respectively. Each regression model also includes country 
dummies. In order to examine the sources of outcome differences between natives and 
migrants, a counterfactual equation is constructed where migrants are treated as natives. In 
other words, the intercept and coefficient in the migrants’ equation are replaced by those of 
the natives’ equation. The counterfactual outcome ?̅?𝑚∗  is defined as  ?̅?𝑚∗ = ?̂?𝑛 + ?̅?𝑚′ ?̂?𝑛       (3) 
The average gap between natives and migrants can be decomposed into a characteristics 
effect, that is, differences between natives’ outcome and counterfactual outcome, and a 
coefficients effect, that is, differences between counterfactual outcome and migrants’ 
outcome.8 The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition equation is ?̅?𝑛 − ?̅?𝑚 = (?̅?𝑛 − ?̅?𝑚)′?̂?𝑛 + ?̅?𝑚′(?̂?𝑛 − ?̂?𝑚)      (4)  
where ?̅?𝑛 and ?̅?𝑚 are vectors including the means of the variables for natives and migrants, 
respectively, and ?̂?𝑛 and ?̂?𝑚 are estimated coefficients from regressions (1) and (2). The first 
term of equation (4) on the right-hand side is the part of the gap due to different (average) 
characteristics of natives and migrants, while the second term is the part of the differential due 
to different coefficients that identifies differences in treatment or behaviour of otherwise 
comparable migrant and native workers. It is this latter term that measures migrant–native 
cleavages that cannot be explained by observable differences between migrants and natives. 
The analysis can also be performed with a binary dependent variable following the adapted 
non-linear decomposition described in Yun (2004) for studying differentials in variables such 
as participation, employment or unemployment. 
 
 
  
                                                          
8
 An important assumption in Oaxaca’s approach is that labour supply and individual characteristics are fixed 
and would not respond to the changes in the outcome variable that would result from the elimination of 
discrimination. 
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Data and sample characteristics  
 
The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) covering a representative sample of 
households in all EU member states is the main source of data for this study. The national 
statistical offices of each member country are responsible for data collection in accordance 
with a harmonized methodology. The EU-LFS collects information on respondents’ personal 
circumstances (including nationality and country of birth) and their labour market status 
during a reference period of one to four weeks immediately prior to the interview. Because 
the sampling structure of the EU-LFS focuses strongly on permanent residents, it is likely to 
omit short-term and seasonal migration. The survey collects several work characteristics of 
employed individuals that are useful for assessing the quality of employment over time. 
Unfortunately, the EU-LFS does not include information on the income status of households.  
 
Owing to its large sample size, the EU-LFS provides reliable information on the share of 
immigrant population in a country and it is commonly used in research on immigration in the 
European context (see, e.g., Huber et al., 2010; Dustmann and Frattini, 2011; D’Amuri and 
Peri, 2010). In this study, the terms ‘immigrant population’ or ‘immigrant individuals’ are 
used in the broad context of immigration, and the origin of immigrants is based on the country 
of birth. One exception is Germany, for which immigrant origin can be determined only by 
nationality. The EU-LFS allows us to concentrate on the situation of immigrants from the EU-
12 countries and contrast their performance with native workforces in the EU-15 countries. 
The final sample used in this study covers the period 2004–2011 and includes individuals of 
working age (15–65 years) in the EU-15, which amounts to more than 5.6 million 
individuals.9 
 
Worker mobility from EU-12 to EU-15 after the EU’s eastern enlargements exhibits several 
noteworthy patterns. Figure 5.1 plots the stock of migrants from EU-12 and EU-15 origins in 
the working-age population separately in the 15 old EU member states. The data show that 
EU-12 migrants were relatively scarce prior to the 2004 enlargement. While the stock of EU-
15 migrants remained stable at 2.4% during the period studied, the stock of EU-12 migrants 
more than tripled from 0.5% in 2004 to 1.7% in 2011. The steepest increase of EU-12 
                                                          
9
 The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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migrants is observed in the UK and Ireland, which fully opened their labour markets to EU-12 
immigrants immediately after their countries’ EU accession. The flow of EU-12 immigrants 
to Italy and Greece accelerated particularly after 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
EU.  
 
Figure 5.1. The share of immigrant population from EU-15 and EU-12 in the 15 old EU 
member states (as % of the population) 
 
 
 
Source: EU-LFS, 2004–2011. Note: The origin of immigrants is determined by their country 
of birth, except for Germany, where immigrants are distinguished by their nationality. The 
sample is limited to individuals aged 15–65 and is weighted by personal weights. 
 
The outbreak of the crisis in the late 2000s had a visible negative effect on migration flows in 
countries greatly affected by the economic crisis, such as Ireland and Spain.10 In other 
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 In 2011, Spain reintroduced transitional arrangements that restricted Romanians’ access to its labour market. 
These restrictions lasted until the end of 2013. 
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countries, the stock of EU-12 immigrants remained constant or continued to grow after 2008 
despite the crisis. Interestingly, the Scandinavian countries became a destination for EU-12 
immigrants only after 2008, which may be explained by the relatively favourable economic 
conditions in these countries during the economic downturn. In 2011, immigrants from EU-12 
countries made up about 13% of the entire population of foreign residents in EU-15. Although 
mobility slowed down in Europe during the crisis, based on observed patterns it appears that 
not too many migrants returned home as a consequence of the economic crisis. This does not 
come as a surprise, given that the employment opportunities in the EU-15 countries also 
remained more favourable during the crisis than the alternatives in migrants’ home countries.  
 
Table 5.1 compares the characteristics of EU-12 migrants with the native population in EU-15 
in the sample. The numbers show that, on average, the migrant group is younger and includes 
a higher percentage of women and comparatively fewer highly educated individuals than 
natives, and also that about half of the migrants are concentrated in densely populated urban 
areas. A comparison of education characteristics reveals that approximately 80% of migrants 
attain at least upper secondary education (compared to 74% of natives), while 25% attain at 
least tertiary education (compared to 29% of natives).11  
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive characteristics of EU-12 migrants and EU-15 native populations (mean 
values) 
Individual characteristics Migrants Natives Diff 
Female 0.53 0.48 0.05 
Age 35.6 40.1 -4.49 
ISCED1 primary 0.05 0.06 -0.01 
ISCED2 lower secondary 0.16 0.20 -0.03 
ISCED3 upper secondary 0.47 0.41 0.06 
ISCED4 post secondary 0.06 0.04 0.02 
ISCED5 university 0.25 0.29 -0.05 
Urbanization: Densely populated area 0.51 0.44 0.07 
Urbanization: Intermediate area 0.20 0.29 -0.09 
Urbanization: Thinly populated area 0.29 0.27 0.02 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
                                                          
11
 The variable ‘highest qualification achieved’ is coded in each country according to the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED). The use of this classification may lead to difficulties in cross-country 
comparisons if ISCED does not adequately reflect the educational system of all countries. We consider this to be 
a minor problem since our analysis includes migrants from European countries in which ISCED is commonly 
used. 
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To study the labour market situation of EU-12 migrants in EU-15 countries, we construct a set 
of indicators regarding the labour market outcomes of migrant and native populations: (i) 
labour force participation; (ii) unemployment; (iii) self-employment; and three indicators for 
job quality measured in terms of (iv) over-education; (v) low-skill employment; and (vi) type 
of contract (see Table 5.2). The data show that while migrants exhibit a higher labour market 
participation rate than natives, they also suffer from a higher unemployment rate. The 
immigrant–native participation gap remained relatively stable during the period studied, while 
the unemployment gap increased substantially during the Great Recession. Migrants exhibit 
an almost three times higher incidence of low-skill jobs and a two times higher incidence of 
over-qualification compared to natives. In general, they are less likely to be self-employed 
and more likely be employed on temporary contracts.  
 
Table 5.2. Labour market indicators for EU-12 migrants and EU-15 natives over time 
 
Outcome variables Migrants 
 
Natives 
    
  2006-07 2008-09 2010-11 Total 2006-07 2008-09 2010-11 Total 
Participation rate 0.792 0.787 0.784 0.779 0.709 0.717 0.718 0.713 
Unempl. rate 0.085 0.120 0.155 0.124 0.062 0.071 0.091 0.075 
Self-employment 0.081 0.097 0.097 0.093 0.156 0.155 0.151 0.152 
Over-education 0.360 0.369 0.368 0.359 0.161 0.169 0.171 0.162 
Low-skill job 0.275 0.271 0.299 0.280 0.099 0.095 0.092 0.096 
Temporary 
contract 0.232 0.207 0.199 0.219 0.144 0.140 0.144 0.143 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
 
Migrant–native cleavages: Empirical evidence  
 
Do the raw gaps reported in the previous section reflect a disparate composition of migrant 
and native populations, or are they reflected in the labour market cleavages as an artefact of 
unequal treatment of otherwise equal individuals? We address these questions by 
decomposing immigrant–native raw gaps into the part that is due to differences in the 
characteristics of immigrant and native population and the part that arises due to factors other 
than the observed differences. We look at migrant–native cleavages in the areas of labour 
force participation and in the incidence of unemployment, self-employment, over-education, 
low-skill employment and temporary contracts. The gaps in the outcome variables between 
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immigrant and native populations are decomposed into a part explained by differences in 
observed characteristics (i.e., the explained part) and a part attributable to differences in the 
estimated coefficients or unobserved factors (i.e., the unexplained part). The compositional 
differences of the immigrant and native workforces are measured in terms of age, education, 
gender and the degree of regional urbanization.  
 
Figure 5.2. Labour market participation of EU-15 natives and EU-12 immigrants 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. See notes to Figure 5.1. Following the International Labour 
Organization’s definition of unemployment, labour market participation rate refers to the 
number of people who are either employed or are actively looking for work. 
 
Labour market participation 
 
Given that the post-enlargement migration flows to the EU-15 from CEE countries were 
predominantly driven by better employment prospects (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010, 
Kahanec et al., 2014; Pytlikova, 2014), the participation of EU-12 immigrants in the labour 
market can be expected to be high. Following the International Labour Organization’s 
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definition, labour market participation rate refers to the number of people who are either 
employed or are actively looking for and can take a job, relative to the working-age 
population. Figure 5.2 depicts unconditional differences in the participation rates between 
EU-12 immigrants and natives across countries and over time. It shows that the participation 
rates of immigrants are visibly higher than those of the natives in the countries where the 
inflows are largest, that is, in Southern Europe, the UK and Ireland. In the continental Europe 
and Nordic countries, the participation rates of EU-12 migrants are broadly comparable and in 
several of them are improving with respect to those of the natives. The figure shows that the 
participation of the immigrant workforce also remained robust during the crisis period, thus 
confirming the strong attachment of migrant workforces to the labour market.  
 
Table 5.3. Decomposition results: Labour market participation rate 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
The decomposition analysis reported in Table 5.3 reveals that whereas the participation gap 
between EU-12 migrants and natives was small and insignificant in 2004, it steadily increased 
to as high as 7.7 percentage points in favour of migrants in 2007, levelling off at around 6 to 7 
percentage points since then. About 3 to 5 percentage points of the gap are explained by 
differences in observable characteristics. Whereas unobserved factors disadvantaged migrants 
in 2004, the disadvantage disappeared in 2005 and turned into an advantage of around 2 to 4 
percentage points in the subsequent years. A possible interpretation is that pre-enlargement 
migrants (observed in 2004) were somewhat positively selected on observable characteristics, 
but unobservable factors nullified this advantage. The observed pattern is consistent with the 
notion that the extension of the freedom of movement to citizens from the new EU member 
states allowed for a stronger positive selection in terms of observable and especially 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Migrant 0.727 *** 0.728 *** 0.777 *** 0.796 *** 0.787 *** 0.787 *** 0.789 *** 0.786 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Native 0.724 *** 0.708 *** 0.713 *** 0.718 *** 0.721 *** 0.721 *** 0.719 *** 0.725 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
difference 0.003 0.021 *** 0.065 *** 0.077 *** 0.066 *** 0.065 *** 0.07 *** 0.061 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
explained 0.026 *** 0.031 *** 0.049 *** 0.048 *** 0.046 *** 0.039 *** 0.035 *** 0.03 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unexplained -0.023 *** -0.01 * 0.015 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.026 *** 0.035 *** 0.031 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N_Total 708,031 670,125 724,924 725,417 702,500 692,233 710,287 696,302
N_Migrant 3,749 4,308 6,285 7,699 8,502 8,878 10,035 10,976
N_Native 704,282 665,817 718,639 717,718 693,998 683,355 700,252 685,326
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unobservable characteristics, yielding a positive participation premium overall. It could also 
be that following the EU 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the barriers to EU-12 citizens’ 
participation diminished and that this enabled them to realize their potential in the receiving 
labour markets, as measured by the unexplained part of the participation differential.   
 
Unemployment 
 
During economic downturns, immigrant workers are often the first to lose their jobs, also 
because they are frequently employed in sectors that are particularly vulnerable to economic 
shocks (OECD, 2013). Figure 5.3 shows that migrants clearly have a higher risk of 
unemployment compared to natives in all countries except Greece, Portugal and the UK. After 
the outbreak of the economic crisis in the late 2000s, the unemployment rates of migrants 
increased sharply compared to natives in several countries, while in other countries both 
groups were equally affected (Greece), affected only a little (Luxembourg) or the migrant 
population was less affected (UK). The pattern is confirmed in the decomposition analysis 
(Table 5.4), which shows that in the period before the crisis, the immigrant–native 
unemployment differential decreased, but that the increase in unemployment rates during the 
crisis was much more pronounced for immigrants. Whereas the pre-crisis gap and its decline 
are mainly due to unobserved factors, deteriorations in the observed characteristics as well as 
unobserved factors contributed to the increase in the gap during the crisis.  
 
Table 5.4. Decomposition results: Unemployment rate 
 
 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Migrant 0.125 *** 0.123 *** 0.090 *** 0.086 *** 0.093 *** 0.145 *** 0.155 *** 0.152 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Native 0.079 *** 0.073 *** 0.065 *** 0.058 *** 0.059 *** 0.082 *** 0.091 *** 0.091 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
difference 0.046 *** 0.050 *** 0.025 *** 0.028 *** 0.033 *** 0.064 *** 0.065 *** 0.061 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
explained 0.006 *** 0.012 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.015 *** 0.037 *** 0.033 *** 0.031 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
unexplained 0.040 *** 0.037 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.026 *** 0.032 *** 0.030 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Total 512,435 473,956 516,729 521,534 506,892 499,803 511,563 505,416
Migrant 2,700 3,139 4,859 6,122 6,684 6,979 7,918 8,620
Native 509,735 470,817 511,870 515,412 500,208 492,824 503,645 496,796
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Figure 5.3. Unemployment rates of EU-15 natives and EU-12 immigrants 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
Self-employment 
 
As shown above, during the Great Recession the risk of unemployment increased more for 
immigrants than for natives in many countries. The immigrant–native gap in the self-
employment rate shows the inverse of the gap in unemployment rates. This countercyclical 
nature of the self-employment gap, although not very pronounced, is reflected in an increasing 
immigrant–native self-employment gap before the crisis and a diminishing gap since its 
outbreak. This indicates that during periods of job scarcity, self-employment may provide an 
alternative form of employment especially for migrants. For example, if a scarcity of jobs 
leads to heightened discrimination of immigrants by employers, self-employment may be a 
way of avoiding such situations.12 Alternatively, it may be that during the downturn, 
                                                          
12
 It may also be that self-employment provided a way to circumvent transitional arrangements restricting access 
of EU-12 workers to EU-15 labor markets (but not restricting the free movement of services and hence the self-
employed). Gradual opening of labor markets would imply a decreasing self-employment rate over time for 
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companies employing migrants put additional pressure on their workers to adopt self-
employed status in order to save on wage-related costs, which, according to the 
conceptualization developed by Bernaciak in the Introduction to this volume, would constitute 
social dumping. One should note as well that throughout the observed period, the rate of self-
employment was lower among immigrants than within the native labour force. Between 20% 
to 48% of the immigrant–native gap in self-employment rates is explained by differences in 
the observable characteristics included in the analysis (Table 5.5). Whereas the explained as 
well as the unexplained parts peak in 2006, the explained part fades away by 2011, but the 
role of the unexplained part increases in 2010 and dominates in 2011. 
 
Table 5.5. Decomposition results: Self-employment rate 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
Quality of employment 
 
During economic downturns, the probability of finding a job is reduced, so the incentives to 
take a lower-quality job can be relatively higher. This may be especially true for migrants for 
several reasons. Unemployed migrants have limited access to the social safety net in the host 
(or home) country, and the earnings opportunities in low-skilled jobs may be acceptable with 
respect to the income standards in their home countries. In addition, immigrants have strong 
incentives to work in order to be able to support household members left in their home 
country. These factors could reduce migrants’ reservation wages and channel them to lower-
quality employment vis-à-vis the natives. We restrict the sample to employed individuals and 
                                                          
EU-12 workers in EU-15, and hence diminishing self-employment gap. The outbreak of crisis however slowed 
the process and even reverted the trend.  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Migrant 0.088 *** 0.107 *** 0.087 *** 0.089 *** 0.096 *** 0.106 *** 0.101 *** 0.098 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Native 0.137 *** 0.157 *** 0.157 *** 0.155 *** 0.156 *** 0.154 *** 0.153 *** 0.150 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
difference -0.048 *** -0.051 *** -0.070 *** -0.067 *** -0.061 *** -0.048 *** -0.051 *** -0.052 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
explained -0.013 *** -0.021 *** -0.027 *** -0.027 *** -0.025 *** -0.021 *** -0.015 *** -0.009 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
unexplained -0.036 *** -0.030 *** -0.043 *** -0.040 *** -0.036 *** -0.027 *** -0.036 *** -0.044 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Total 471,667 439,205 483,140 490,779 476,396 458,332 464,534 458,818
Migrant 2,387 2,753 4,448 5,593 6,061 5,963 6,686 7,308
Native 469,280 436,452 478,692 485,186 470,335 452,369 457,848 451,510
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decompose the gap observed in working conditions such as the incidence of over-education, 
employment in low-skilled occupations and temporary contracts. 
 
a. Over-education 
 
The match between qualifications and jobs is an important measure for evaluating the 
performance of highly skilled workers in the labour market. In general, as argued by Huber et 
al. (2010), highly skilled migrants are more likely to occupy jobs under their level of 
education relative to the native workforce. The main reasons arise from differences between 
home- and host-country education systems, the lack of formal recognition of skills abroad or 
the lack of specific human capital (such as language skills or knowledge of labour market 
institutions), and various forms of discrimination. We construct a simple indicator of over-
education to evaluate the skill-matching of workers following the method of realized matches. 
. Based on occupational codes (two-digit ISCO), in each occupational group we identify the 
level of education of the median worker, distinguishing between low, medium and high 
educational level. All workers in the same occupational group with a higher education than 
the median worker are then marked as over-educated. The identification of over-educated 
workers is done separately for each country to account for country-specific differences. The 
high incidence of qualification mismatch should be interpreted with caution because 
occupations are not a perfect proxy for job requirements.  
 
Table 5.6. Decomposition results: Incidence of over-education among workers 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
Our findings suggest that highly skilled migrants face substantial difficulties in transferring 
skills across borders. Migrants exhibit an almost two times higher risk of over-education in 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Migrant 0.318 *** 0.377 *** 0.392 *** 0.419 *** 0.407 *** 0.427 *** 0.420 *** 0.453 ***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Native 0.178 *** 0.201 *** 0.201 *** 0.206 *** 0.209 *** 0.214 *** 0.218 *** 0.207 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
difference 0.140 *** 0.176 *** 0.190 *** 0.213 *** 0.197 *** 0.212 *** 0.202 *** 0.247 ***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
explained -0.007 -0.010 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012 * 0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
unexplained 0.147 *** 0.186 *** 0.190 *** 0.215 *** 0.204 *** 0.217 *** 0.214 *** 0.243 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Total 386,467 346,981 381,210 389,089 380,201 367,775 376,220 371,187
Migrant 2,030 2,333 3,826 4,756 5,220 5,002 5,531 5,863
Native 384,437 344,648 377,384 384,333 374,981 362,773 370,689 365,324
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their labour market position relative to natives. The results of the decomposition analysis 
reported in Table 5.6 reveal that the substantial part of the gap in over-education between 
immigrant and native workers is not explained by observable characteristics, which in fact 
work in favour of migrants. An important implication is that migrants accept jobs below their 
educational level mainly in relation to unobservable factors. A possible explanation is that 
over-education emerges due to the low language ability or more generally due to the low 
transferability of the unobserved skills of migrants. Our results further indicate that the 
incidence of over-education has increased especially among immigrants, and that most of the 
increase took place before the crisis, primarily due to a steep increase in the unexplained part 
of the differential. As those were the years of significantly increased east-west migration, this 
latter finding appears to underscore the importance of immigrant adjustment and imperfect 
skill transferability. Some qualification mismatch is likely to be explained by issues other than 
skills discrepancies, such as the skill heterogeneity among workers with the same 
qualifications. 
 
b. Low-skilled jobs 
 
Our results show that the high incidence of over-education among immigrant workers goes 
hand in hand with their concentration in the lowest-skill occupations. This outcome is 
confirmed by the share of migrant workers employed in the elementary occupations 
characterized by simple and routine tasks (ISCO group 9). Our findings reported in Table 5.7 
show that immigrants are three times more likely to be employed in the elementary 
occupations compared to natives and that the gap cannot be explained by differences in 
observable characteristics. After 2008, the incidence of taking a low-skill job increased for 
immigrants, while the opposite pattern is observed for native workers. A tentative explanation 
would be that immigrant workers who cannot access the welfare system are more likely to 
accept low-skill jobs when the competition for jobs becomes tense, while the native 
workforce has more opportunities available to avoid lowest-skill employment, including 
drawing unemployment benefits, entering early retirement or inactivity, or relying on other 
sources of household income. The decomposition analysis confirms that employment in the 
low-skill occupations is almost exclusively due to the unobserved characteristics of migrants. 
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Table 5.7. Decomposition results: Incidence of elementary occupation 
 
 Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
Table 5.8. Decomposition results: Temporary contracts 
 
Source: EU-LFS 2004–2011. 
 
c. Type of contract 
 
We show above that immigrants have higher incidences of over-qualification and low-skill 
employment and a higher risk of unemployment. In addition, a higher prevalence of 
temporary contracts is noticeable among immigrants, although the share of immigrants with 
temporary contracts exhibits a declining trend and the native–immigrant gap is closing. Our 
results in Table 5.8 illustrate that only a small part of the immigrant–native gap defining the 
quality of employment is explained by workers’ characteristics, a larger part being due to 
cleavages that cannot be explained by observable differences, which may be related to 
immigrants’ disconnectedness from social networks, differences in ethnic capital or 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Migrant 0.232 *** 0.249 *** 0.256 *** 0.266 *** 0.250 *** 0.262 *** 0.285 *** 0.282 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Native 0.085 *** 0.088 *** 0.088 *** 0.087 *** 0.085 *** 0.083 *** 0.083 *** 0.079 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
difference 0.147 *** 0.161 *** 0.168 *** 0.179 *** 0.164 *** 0.178 *** 0.201 *** 0.203 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
explained -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.005 ** -0.009 *** -0.005 ** 0.006 *** 0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unexplained 0.164 *** 0.174 *** 0.183 *** 0.184 *** 0.173 *** 0.184 *** 0.195 *** 0.189 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Total 471,819 439,362 483,265 490,869 476,518 458,437 464,694 458,918
Migrant 2,389 2,754 4,449 5,567 6,065 5,930 6,688 7,309
Native 469,430 436,608 478,816 485,302 470,453 452,507 458,006 451,609
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Migrant 0.287 *** 0.270 *** 0.236 *** 0.232 *** 0.216 *** 0.198 *** 0.193 *** 0.204 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Native 0.144 *** 0.146 *** 0.144 *** 0.147 *** 0.143 *** 0.136 *** 0.143 *** 0.146 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
difference 0.142 *** 0.125 *** 0.092 *** 0.085 *** 0.073 *** 0.062 *** 0.050 *** 0.058 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
explained 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.005 * 0.009 *** 0.004 * 0.007 *** 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unexplained 0.123 *** 0.106 *** 0.087 *** 0.076 *** 0.069 *** 0.055 *** 0.048 *** 0.055 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Total 398,713 363,155 400,731 407,977 395,720 381,761 388,243 385,168
Migrant 2,153 2,429 4,026 5,052 5,428 5,289 5,954 6,549
Native 396,560 360,726 396,705 402,925 390,292 376,472 382,289 378,619
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discrimination arising, for example, from employers’ inclination to employ migrants on 
temporary contracts (also see Berntsen and Lillie, this volume).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter studied the labour market position of EU-12 immigrants in the old EU member 
states after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and during the Great Recession. Using 
EU-LFS data and the Oaxaca–Blinder–Yun type of decomposition techniques, we show that 
although immigrant–native gaps can be partly explained by group differences in individual 
characteristics, there still exist significant migrant–native cleavages in EU labour markets that 
cannot be explained by observable factors and that are therefore due to other factors including 
differences in social or ethnic capital, language skills or discrimination.  
 
Our results show a worrying trend of increased labour market gaps in most domains between 
EU-12 migrants and natives in old EU member states. The two exceptions among the outcome 
variables studied are self-employment, which exhibits steady gaps, and the incidence of 
temporary contracts, where the gaps declined during the period studied. Another important 
result is that these gaps can only partly be explained by observable characteristics such as age, 
gender or education. In most cases, a larger part of the gaps is due to unobserved factors. For 
labour market participation and unemployment, immigrant–native cleavages decreased after 
enlargement; however, the recent crisis slowed down these trends. Cleavages in self-
employment (which perhaps served as a second-best option for those who were unable to find 
waged employment or resulted from employees’ or employers’ efforts to minimize labour 
costs) exhibited patterns inverse to those we found for unemployment cleavages. As we 
expected, cleavages in the incidence of over-education and low-skilled employment grew in 
view of increased labour mobility in the early post-enlargement period but levelled off during 
the crisis. The unexplained gaps in temporary contracts decreased especially before the Great 
Recession. 
 
The observed differences concerning the incidence of self-employment, low-skilled 
employment and temporary contracts might result from strategic behaviour on the part of 
migrant workers or their employers aimed at reducing the costs of labour. However, on the 
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basis of the available statistical data, it is not possible to directly measure the extent of social 
dumping incentives and/or practices as discussed by Bernaciak in the Introduction of this 
volume, nor is it possible to establish a causal link between social dumping practices and the 
persistence of the above-mentioned cleavages. 
 
The above limitation notwithstanding, the results of our study do suggest that Europe needs to 
do much more to facilitate and fully benefit from the free mobility of workers across its 
labour markets. In this respect, unexplained gaps measured in this chapter are of particular 
concern because they signify linguistic, social or ethnicity-related barriers, skill mismatches in 
the labour market (also including discrimination of migrants) or possible vulnerabilities of 
migrant workers resulting in their exclusion from quality employment and working 
conditions. These cleavages may undermine the social fabric in the receiving countries and 
lead to a vicious circle of negative attitudes and ill-chosen migration and integration policies. 
They may also spark even greater fears of social dumping in the future because these 
cleavages essentially imply lower quality of employment of otherwise equal migrants.  
 
On the other hand, one needs to be careful when interpreting these cleavages. Mobility 
generally goes hand in hand with adjustment, which may be swift or sluggish, also depending 
on labour market institutions and policies. Migrants’ choices matter, too. Temporary migrants 
may find it inefficient to invest in human capital specific to the receiving country if the costs 
of such investment are not compensated by higher earnings over a sufficiently long period of 
time. And yet, temporary and circular migrants may benefit from their migration experience, 
and mutual benefits in terms of better skill-matching and economic efficiency from such 
migration may also result for the receiving and the sending countries. And, finally, whenever 
the lack of adjustment results from institutional barriers to integration or unequal treatment of 
migrants, these and not migration as such are the primary sources of the migrant–native 
cleavages. Against this background, we can conclude that whereas the free mobility of labour 
is by and large a success story, especially when it comes to the benefits for Europe’s labour 
markets, equal treatment of migrants and the elimination of barriers to migrants’ social and 
labour market integration remain among the key policy challenges for the enlarged EU. 
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